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PROPERTY IN OUTER SPACE: THE COMMON HERITAGE
OF MANKIND PRINCIPLE VS. THE "FIRST IN TIME,
FIRST IN RIGHT" RULE OF PROPERTY LAW
CAROL R. BUXTON
"The charm of history and its enigmatic lesson consist in the
fact that, from age to age, nothing changes and yet everything
is completely different."
Aldous Huxley1
"One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh; but the
earth abideth forever .... The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth
down, and hasteth to the place where he arose .... "
Epigraph to The Sun Also Rises, Ernest Hemingway2
I. INTRODUCTION
PROXIMATELY 100,000 YEARS AGO,' modern humans
began canvassing the earth, spending their days in nomadic
existence, in constant quest for food and water. Due to the
scant overall population of the earth at that time, and the vast-
ness of the land, humans rarely encountered other human
groups.4 Even in chance meetings, however, one might imagine
early confrontations laced with friction and unease, with proba-
ble disputes arising over food and water, the essential tools of
survival. Nomads gave little thought to the land they crossed
while they hunted and gathered; any fighting they engaged in
likely involved food (i.e., berries or game), rather than the land
beneath their ever-moving feet. They just wanted to survive.
I See http://www.nonstopenglish.com/reading/quotations (last visited May 9,
2005).
2 ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE SUN ALSO RISES, epigraph (Charles Scribner's Sons
1926) (quoting Ecclesiastes 1:3-11).
3 Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History, Human Origins Program,
at http://www.mnh.si.edu/anthro/humanorigins/faq/Encarta/encarta.htm
(last visited May 9, 2005).
4 Id.
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When humans shifted from hunting and gathering to farming
roughly 8,000 to 10,000 years ago,5 life grew easier; no longer
forced to perpetually pursue food, man settled into civilized so-
cieties. With civilization dawned the idea of property owner-
ship, and man became territorial. Communities drew together
in war, not only battling to defend their land from aggressors,
but also striking out to conquer more land for themselves.
Property ownership blossomed into a symbol of power and
wealth, and the age of empire mentality transpired.
Throughout history, long before the advent of international
law, conquering land seemed simple: the strongest army won
the land, and its freshly planted flag flapped in the breeze above
the newly conquered territory as a symbol of the acquisition. No
rules existed to ensure fairness. Armies composed of superior
fighters seized land, or those skilled enough to master the risk
of exploration declared new, unsettled ground for their king-
doms. For thousands of years, modern man followed this seem-
ingly savage "first in time, first in right" rule of property.
Man, after all, acts as a selfish creature-squabbling with his
fellow inhabitants over anything he wants to control, not unlike
children fighting over toys. By the mid-twentieth century, how-
ever, the war-scarred international community realized that an
advisory council or discussion forum needed to address interna-
tional property issues before more conflict erupted in the ad-
vanced global age. Laws needed to act as a moral baby-sitter to
ensure that nations played the property game fairly and that no
nation denied another nation its due right to areas not yet con-
quered or populated. In the post-modern era, even if prompted
by apprehension and distrust, the global community exuded an
ideal of equity. Unfortunately, nothing in this world seems fair.
From the beginning of time, civilizations intelligent or fortu-
nate enough to make use of resources within their reach ex-
celled and dominated. Man intuitively exploits natural
resources and develops technology to better his existence.
Human nature demonstrated this trait from the start-repre-
sented by innovations such as the wheel, tools and weapons,
medicine, and the domestication of animals.6 At some point,
however, the cradle of civilization lost its foothold. Many civili-
zations, though globally dominant in centuries past, lag behind
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many others never even got a fighting chance due to factors
such as disease, famine, natural disaster, or lack of natural
resources.
However, in the post-modern age, floating somewhere in the
peace-and-love era encompassing the 1960s, the newly-civilized
international community decided that the barbaric property
principle "first in time, first in right" should not be applied to
the deep seabed, Antarctica, or outer space-the only regions
not controlled by any one sovereign.7 This theory sprang up
generally because exploitation of valuable resources in these re-
gions presented developing nations with an opportunity "to
share in the world's resources rather than remain economically
marginalized[,]" and because each of these areas presented a
dilemma regarding habitation and defense.8 No nation occu-
pied these territories and no nation desired a "race to own"
without a guarantee of who would emerge victorious. Because
these zones harbor coveted natural resources, every nation
craved a piece of the action without the hurry-hurry state of
mind regardless of economic or technological stance.
This article examines the ineffectiveness of the international
community's novel approach to property law and scrutinizes the
inconsistent, ambiguous language in outer space property trea-
ties. Section II provides a history of the common heritage of
mankind principle as applied to areas on earth and in outer
space. Section III analyzes relevant space law and applies it to
the acquisition of natural resources in space, property rights on
the moon, and the appropriation of satellite orbit slots. Finally,
Section IV concludes with the recognition that, due to man's
inherent nature, space faring nations will resort to the age-old,
primitive "first in time, first in right" rule of property that the
international community attempted to avoid.
II. THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND PRINCIPLE
Understanding the extension of property laws to outer space
and celestial bodies requires comprehension of the underlying
common heritage ideal, the essence of man's attempt to civilize
outer space. Under the common heritage of mankind principle
(the "common heritage principle" or the "principle"), nations
7 Julie A. Jiru, Comment, Star Wars and Space Malls: When the Paint Chips Off a
Treaty's Golden Handcuffs, 42 S. TEX. L. REv. 155, 159 (2000).
8 Lea Brilmayer & Natalie Klein, Land and Sea: Two Sovereignty Regimes in Search
of a Common Denominator, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 703, 726 (2001).
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manage, rather than own, certain designated international
zones.9 No national sovereignty over these spaces exists, and in-
ternational law (i.e., treaties, international custom) governs.
The common heritage of mankind principle deals with interna-
tional management of resources within a territory, rather than
the territory itself.'
Because the principle renders claim of title to designated in-
ternational, common heritage areas worthless and unrecog-
nized, the issue for countries becomes access.1 The common
heritage principle seems unconcerned with ownership of desig-
nated areas, but rather focuses on the "uses of them for the ben-
efit of humankind, to serve the common interest of peoples
everywhere.' 1 2 It may prove difficult, however, to distinguish
the idea of access from that of ownership. As with most interna-
tional principles, a split between less-developed nations and de-
veloped nations over the interpretation of the common heritage
principle evolved.
Less-developed nations believe that international areas desig-
nated for the common heritage of mankind do not belong to
any one sovereign, but instead to all nations.13 Therefore, any
resource or benefit derived from those resources, or the use of
them, should serve all of mankind. 4 Referring to it as a "com-
mon property" approach, less-developed nations assert that
there should be common management of such areas, with a sin-
gular group possessing exclusive rights to exploit natural re-
sources and distribute those resources equally to all nations,
regardless of which nations actually funded the effort (either ec-
onomically or by developing the technology or both)."
9 Harminderpal Singh Rana, Note, The "Common Heritage of Mankind" & the
Final Frontier: A Revaluation of Values Constituting the International Legal Regime for
Outer Space Activities, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 225, 228 (1994) (citing Christopher C.
Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 35 INT'L
& CoMP. L.Q. 190, 191 (1986)).
10 Christopher C. Joyner, The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in Inter-
national Law, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 615, 620 (1999) (reviewing KusAL BASLAR,
THE HAGUE (1998)).
11 Rana, supra note 9, at 229.
12 Joyner, supra note 10.
13 Mary E. Schwind, Open Stars: An Examination of the United States Push to Priva-
tize International Telecommunications Satellites, 10 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 93,
94 (1986).
14 Id.
15 Rana, supra note 9, at 230-31.
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Under this interpretation, a nation that did not contribute fi-
nancially, nor had any involvement in developing the necessary
technology, would reap the benefits of the exploitative activity.
Not only does this seem inherently unfair, but this hardly pro-
vides an incentive for technologically advanced nations to con-
duct expeditions. Additionally, this interpretation does not
provide incentive for less-developed nations to develop technol-
ogy or fund exploration. Why fund the research and develop-
ment when the reward will be the same?
Developed nations interpret the principle as meaning that
"anyone can exploit these natural resources so long as no single
nation claims exclusive jurisdiction" over the area from which
they are recovered.1 6 Simply stated, every nation enjoys access
and each nation must make the most of that access. The heri-
tage lies in the access to the resources, not the technology or
funding to exploit them. Developed nations may be prudent to
interpret the principle in this manner because developed na-
tions most likely possess the economic means and the technol-
ogy to exploit natural resources. 7 Developed countries argue
that because they spend their time and money developing the
technology that enables them to harvest resources, and they
fund the expeditions that collect the resources, forcing them to
share those benefits with countries that have contributed little
or nothing to the effort would be unjust.1 " Developed nations
do not like the principle included in treaties, stating that se-
verely reducing the economic incentive discourages the devel-
opment of technology to exploit natural resources,1 9 a viewpoint
all too clear for capitalistic societies.
A. THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND PRINCIPLE As
APPLIED To AREAs ON EARTH
1. The Deep Seabed
In the midst of a war-ridden age, Pindar stated, "Seek not, my
soul, the life of the immortals; but enjoy to the fullest the re-
sources that are within thy reach."2 ° Perhaps one can imagine
16 Schwind, supra note 13, at 97, see also Rana supra note 9, at 230-31.
17 Stephen D. Mau, Equity, the Third World and the Moon Treaty, 8 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 221, 232-33 (1984).
18 Id. at 236.
19 Grier C. Raclin, From Ice to Ether: The Adoption of a Regime to Govern Resource
Exploitation in Outer Space, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 727, 738-39 (1986).
20 See http://www.quotationspage.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
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that the resources to which Pindar referred include the sea. For
several millennia, man utilized the sea for trade, commerce, and
as a corridor to far-away destinations. Land-locked states fought
to control seaside soil, for those with access to the sea domi-
nated, but no nation owned the sea. The possibility of sover-
eignty over the sea seemed virtually impossible due to the
difficulty of defending the territory and the impossibility of per-
manent habitation.2'
The need for an international law governing the deep seabed
began in the late 1960s when the mining of valuable minerals
found on the seabed floor became possible.22 Arvid Pardo,
Malta's former Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) and
hailed as the forefather of the common heritage of mankind
principle in the law of the sea,23 stated:
The objective of the Maltese proposal was to replace the princi-
ple of freedom of the high seas by the principle of common heri-
tage of mankind in order to preserve the greater part of ocean
space as a commons accessible to the international community.
The commons of the high seas, however, would be no longer
open to the whims of the users and exploiters; it would be inter-
nationally administered. International administration of the
commons and management of its resources for the common
good distinguished the principle of common heritage from the
existing traditional principle of the high seas as res communis.24
Pardo understood the need for an international common
body to exploit and distribute the resources. 25 Developing na-
tions embrace this approach-referred to as the "common
property" approach. Without an international regime, nations
feared (and rightly so) that those with the greatest economical
and technological advantages would reap the greatest rewards. 26
Therefore, when mining the deep seabed became feasible, the
Third Law of the Sea Convention established the International
Seabed Authority, which licenses and regulates mineral explora-
tion of the seabed in the international areas (the seabed and
21 Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 8, at 707-08.
22 Id.
23 Rana, supra note 9, at 235 (citing L.F.E. Goldie, A Note on Some Diverse Mean-
ings of "The Common Heritage of Mankind', 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 69, 86
(1983)).
24 Id. at 236.
25 Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 8, at 726.
26 Id.
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ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and thus
deemed to be the common heritage of mankind).27
The fundamental principles of the administration, indicated
in the Convention and in the Implementation Agreement
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1994, in-
clude that:
1) the mineral resources of the international seabed area shall
be the common heritage of mankind and not subject to ap-
propriation by any State;28
2) all rights in the mineral resources of the international area
shall be vested in mankind as a whole and the economic ben-
efits from deep seabed mining are to be shared on a non-
discriminatory basis for the benefit of mankind as a whole; 29
3) the International Seabed Authority is established as the or-
ganization to administer such resources and to promote and
encourage the conduct of the marine scientific research in
the international area. °
Unfortunately, the vague reference to the common heritage
of mankind ideal fails to settle the dispute between the devel-
oped and less-developed nations. Although the Third Law of
the Sea Convention advocates "for the equitable sharing of finan-
cial and other economic benefits derived from activities in the
[a]rea[,]" the dispute between nations continues.3 1 "Equitable"
seems synonymous with "fair;" therefore, a literal interpretation
of this provision would suggest that financial and economic ben-
efits would be proportionate to the economic, scientific, or tech-
nological effort put forth by each state.12 "Equal," however,
means equivalent or identical.3 3 A literal interpretation of this
would imply that financial or economic benefits would be di-
vided among all states, regardless of effort or input of each'
state.3 4 Because the United States objects to the latter interpre-
tation, it refused to sign the seabed agreement; instead, along
27 Jiru, supra note 7, at 160.
28 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of Dec. 10, 1983, July 28, 1994, preamble, 33
I.L.M. 1309, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3.
29 See id.
30 Id. at annex 5.
31 Jiru, supra note 7, at 161.
32 See generally Kelly M. Zullo, Note, The Need to Clarify the Status of Property Rights
in International Space Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 2413 (2002).
33 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 391 (10th ed. 1996), available at
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=dictionary&va=equal.
34 See generally Zullo, supra note 32.
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with other developed nations, the United States established its
own system for regulating seabed exploitation.3 5
2. Antarctica
In the 1820s, when British, American, and Russian expedi-
tions began exploring the area near the South Pole, many be-
lieved that the South Pole consisted simply of many islands of
ice.36 In 1840, Antarctica became known as a continent, and in
the early 1900s, seven countries claimed sovereignty over eighty-
five percent of Antarctica, though no other country pays
credence to those claims 7.3  "Small uncommercial quantities" of
iron ore, chromium, copper, gold, nickel, platinum, coal and
hydrocarbons, and other minerals are found within the
Antarctic continent.3 8
The Antarctic Treaty came into force in the early 1960s, when
the international community strived to establish that some areas
simply belong to all inhabitants of the earth. The Antarctic
Treaty system exists to "facilitate peaceful international coopera-
tion for scientific research and environmental preservation. 3 9
The Antarctic Treaty does not expressly include common heri-
tage language, but application of the principle to Antarctica ap-
pears widely accepted.4 ° This treaty "freezes" the claims by the
seven countries claiming ownership, though the United States
and Russia each reserved rights to claim sovereignty.4' Also,
mining on the continent can only occur after "unanimous con-
sent of all signatories," and no mining has occurred to date.4 2
B. THE COMMON HERITAGE PRINCIPLE As APPLIED To AREAs
IN OUTER SPACE
The power struggle between the United States and the former
Soviet Union, the two nations involved in the race to space,
along with the paranoia and suspicion resulting from the Cold
35 Jiru, supra note 7, at 161.
36 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2002: Antarctica, at http://
www.cia.gov/cia/publications /factbook/geos/ay.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2005)
[herinafter Antarctica].
37 Jiru, supra note 7, at 162.
38 Antarctica, supra note 36.
39 Jiru, supra note 7, at 162 (citing Barbara Ellen Heim, Exploring the Last Fron-
tiers for Mineral Resources: A Comparison of International Law Regarding the Deep Sea-
bed, Outer Space, and Antarctica, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 819, 839 (1990)).
40 Rana, supra note 9, at 237-38.
41 Antarctica, supra note 36.
42 Jim, supra note 7, at 162.
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War, fueled the avoidance of a "race to own" any part of space."3
The former Soviet Union emerged as the pioneering leader
when it launched the first satellite (Sputnik) into orbit in 195744
and landed the Luna IX on the moon in 1966, 45 sending waves
of alarm through the United States, which feared that the Sovi-
ets would stake a property claim in the moon. This prompted
the United States to initiate treaties limiting activities in outer
space to peaceful purposes and preventing any state from exer-
cising ownership.46 The following two sections focus on the
common heritage concept as applied to the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty and the 1979 Moon Treaty.
1. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty
The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ("the Outer Space Treaty")
became the "cornerstone of international space law"47 and the
first treaty drafted by the United Nations' Committee on Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).48 As with the Antarctica
Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty promotes freedom of access for
research and scientific investigation. The treaty denies land
ownership rights to any one sovereign, and instead states that
"exploration and use of outer space, should be carried on for
the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of economic
or scientific development. 49
The Outer Space Treaty does not use the term "common heri-
tage of mankind," but rather uses the term "province of man-
kind," stating that "exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried
out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries ... and
43 Id. at 156.
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Sputnik, at http://history.
msfc.nasa.gov/rocketry/34.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
45 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Destination Moon: A History
of the Lunar Orbiter Program, at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/TM-
3487/app-c.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
46 Stacey L. Lowder, Comment, A State's International Legal Role: From the Earth to
the Moon, 7 TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 253, 268 (1999).
47 Ty S. Twibell, Note, Space Law: Legal Restraints on Commercialization and Devel-
apment of Outer Space, 65 UMKC L. REv. 589, 592 (1997).
48 Rana, supra note 9, at 240.
- Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened
for signatureJan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 (entered into force October 10, 1967).
2004] 697
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
shall be the province of all mankind. '5° According to Professor
Armel Kerrest, 1 "province" seems associated with the idea of
territory or the responsibility over a territory, thus giving the no-
tion of control rather than "property and possible wealth. 52
Professor Kerrest states,
By itself the common control of humanity over outer space and
celestial bodies does not deal with appropriation and property.
It only means that the rules over outer space and celestial bodies
can only be made by Humanity as a whole. No state ... can rule
exploration and use of outer space, [or] can exercise any territo-
rial jurisdiction over it without the agreement of Humanity.51
Professor Kerrest further states that the idea of "heritage,"
however, seems directly linked with property and ownership.54
He refers to the Law of the Sea Convention, which declares that
"the sea floor and its resources are the common heritage of
mankind," and suggests that this language makes it clear "that
the property of these resources is [recognized] to a legal person:
humanity. '5 5 Unfortunately, "humanity" seems vague. Professor
Kerrest questions, "Who is humanity or[,] more precisely[,] who
is entitled to speak for humanity?51 6 In a one-country, one-vote
system, the majority usually consists of the less-developed na-
tions due to their great number.5 1 More likely than not, the ma-
jority does not include space-faring nations.
2. The Moon Treaty
As of February 1, 2001, only nine states ratified the 1979
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies (the "Moon Treaty"), and an additional
five signed it.58 Most of the Moon Treaty just rehashes the
Outer Space Treaty, though some new provisions do appear.59
5o Id. art. 4.
51 Armel Kerrest, Outer Space: Res Communis, Common Heritage or Common Prov-
ince of Mankind?, available at http://fraise.univ-brest.fr/~kerrest/IDEI/Nice-ap-







58 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1434, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon
Treaty].
59 Jim, supra note 7, at 163.
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Because of these new provisions, many countries refused to
sign." As with the Outer Space Treaty, the common heritage
ideal materializes, coated at times in the "province of all man-
kind" language. 61 This language first appears in Article 4, which
states, "exploration and use of the moon shall be the province of
all mankind and shall be carried out for the benefit ... of all
countries. '62 As Professor Kerrest notes, the province of all
mankind "is not the moon and celestial bodies[,] but the explora-
tion and use."6 This interpretation aligns itself with the argu-
ment of the developed nations: the heritage lies in the access.
In Article 11 of the Moon Treaty, the common heritage of
mankind language surfaces, and the article states, "[t]he moon
and its natural resources are the common heritage of man-
kind . . ." and states may explore and use the moon without
discrimination.64 The Article continues by requiring the future
establishment of an international regime "to govern the ex-
ploitation of the natural resources of the moon as such exploita-
tion is about to become feasible,' 65 reminiscent of the regime
established to regulate exploitation of the seabed. Unfortu-
nately, no such regime yet exists; the Moon Treaty only provides
that one shall exist in the future. 66
The United States, along with many other nations, refused to
sign the treaty, in large part due to the common heritage
ideal.67 If the United States' behavior in dealing with the Inter-
national Seabed Authority indicates its future actions, the
United States likely will enact its own system governing the ex-
ploitation of celestial bodies. Unbound by the Moon Treaty and
certain to develop the necessary technology sooner than other
nations, the United States will continue to follow the barbaric
"first in time, first in right" theory of property despised by less-
developed nations.
60 Id. (stating that developed nations and less-developed nations disagree on
issues relating to ownership and appropriation of resources derived from the
moon). These issues will be addressed further in this note, infra.
61 Id.
62 Moon Treaty, supra note 58.
63 Kerrest, supra note 51.
64 See Moon Treaty, supra note 58, art. 11.
65 Id.
66 Heidi Keefe, Making the Final Frontier Feasible: A Critical Look at the Current
Body of Outer Space Law, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 345, 356
(1995).
67 Id. at 357.
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III. PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND APPROPRIATION IN
OUTER SPACE
In the age of private and commercial wealth, asserting owner-
ship in outer space seems no longer unimaginable, but it may be
against international law.6" As stated previously, the Cold War
between the United States and the former Soviet Union and the
simultaneous race to space prompted paranoia that one country
would gain "irreversible advantage by militarizing outer
space. '69 Referring to the "first in time, first in right" property
principle that dominated the earth for thousands of years, Ar-
thurJ. Goldberg, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations
General Assembly stated, ". . . as we stand on the threshold of
the space age, our first responsibility as governments is clear: we
must make sure that man's earthly conflicts will not be carried
into outer space .... ,,70 Though this intention seems noble, re-
versing human behavior spanning several thousand years may
prove impossible. Man intuitively exploits resources within his
reach to better himself, not necessarily his neighbor.
In looking at the big picture, one can easily identify that space
resources nearest to earth, and thus the easiest to exploit, ap-
pear limited. The universe may stretch indefinitely in all direc-
tions. However, without drastic technological advances, man
seems tethered to earth-incapable of traveling great distances
in space. For unmanned missions, the issue becomes expense:
exploitation activities closer to earth cost less than expeditions
farther away. Therefore, celestial bodies such as the moon and
near-earth asteroids exist as limited resources, not because of
their rarity, but because of their close proximity to earth.71 On
the other hand, satellite orbit slots could become a finite re-
source, 7 2 as an orbit slot can only accommodate a fixed number
of satellites. International law should govern the exploitation
and use of such resources, as well as the appropriation of celes-
tial territories. The resources include minerals mined from the
moon or other celestial bodies, and territory appropriation en-
68 EzraJ. Reinstein, Owning Outer Space, 20 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 59, 62 (1999).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 63.
72 Satellite resources become a finite resource due to the limitation on capac-
ity. If the user utilizes the resource properly, the orbit slot remains infinitely
renewable.
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compasses not only celestial surfaces, but satellite orbit slots as
well.73
A. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN NATURAL RESOURCES IN OUTER SPACE
Article 6 of the Moon Treaty promotes "freedom of scientific
investigation . . . [by allowing states to] .. .collect on and re-
move from the moon samples of its mineral and other sub-
stances," and Article 8 allows exploitation "on or below [the
moon's] surface. '74 The treaty further states that "[s]uch sam-
ples shall remain at the disposal of those States Parties which
caused them to be collected and may be used by them for scien-
tific purposes. 75
When construing this language, one likely will interpret that
states can collect samples of minerals for research, which effec-
tively exhibits ownership over those samples. 76 The "province of
mankind" language weaved throughout the treaty becomes no-
tably absent here.77 Clearly, the ideal would seem to mandate
that samples be shared, either equitably or equally, with all of
mankind.
Sample collection completely contradicts the aforementioned
language in Article 11 of the Moon Treaty which states that
"[n]either the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any
part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property of
any State, international intergovernmental or non-governmental
organization, national organization or non-governmental entity
or of any natural person. "78 A logical interpretation would re-
quire that "part of its natural resources" includes mineral sam-
ples from the moon. With such incompatible language within
the body of the Moon Treaty, no mystery exists as to why devel-
oped nations' interpretations differ from that of the less-devel-
oped nations. Further, with the absence of an international
regime, as called for in Article 11, reconciliation of the conflict-
ing provisions seems unlikely.
73 Id. at 64.
74 Moon Treaty, supra note 58, art. 6, 8.
75 Id. art. 6.
76 Rana, supra note 9, at 247-48. The author notes that data collected from
such samples receives similar scrutiny. However, such issues exist beyond the
scope of this comment, which focuses on territorial space and exploitation activ-
ity, rather than data collected from such activity.
77 Moon Treaty, supra note 58, art. 6-8.
78 Id. art. 11 (emphasis added).
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B. PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE SURFACE OF THE MOON
Article 8 of the Moon Treaty allows states to: 1) "[1] and their
space objects on the moon and launch them from the moon";
and 2) "[p]lace their personnel, space vehicles, equipment, fa-
cilities, stations and installations anywhere on or below the sur-
face of the moon. ' 79 The treaty also provides that "[p] ersonnel,
space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations
may move or be moved freely over or below the surface of the
moon," and such activities "shall not interfere with the activities
of other States Parties on the moon. °80 Article 9 of the Moon
Treaty further clarifies this by declaring that states "may estab-
lish manned and unmanned stations on the moon," but requir-
ing that "a station shall use only that area which is required for
the needs of the station . . ." and shall not "impede the free
access" of other states.~1
Again, the line appears blurred. A party could place a semi-
permanent station on the moon which both occupies the sur-
face and, by its nature, blocks access to that specific area. Con-
tinued occupancy means "taking possession of that which at the
moment is the property of no man, with the view... of acquir-
ing the property in it for yourself. '8 2 Therefore, planting an un-
manned space station on the surface of the moon, well within
the allowances of the Moon Treaty, constitutes effective owner-
ship-but without the possessory label. States may engage in ac-
tivities equivalent to ownership, as long as no one calls it
"ownership." What will happen when two nations seek to plant
unmanned stations in the same area? One can only surmise that
nations will resort to the primitive, but familiar, "first in time,
first in right" theory of property law. An irony exists in the prob-
able occurrence of this happening, as the international commu-
nity enacted the Moon Treaty specifically to avoid this behavior.
C. APPROPRIATION OF SATELLITE ORBIT SLOTS
The Outer Space Treaty, which governs outer space, prevents
national sovereignty claims, but does not expressly prohibit pri-
vate appropriation, unlike the Moon Treaty, which prohibits
both national and private appropriation of the moon and other
79 Id. art. 8.
80 Id.
81 Id. art. 9.
82 Jiru, supra note 7, at 158.
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bodies." In the past decade, the private-sector investment in
telecommunications satellites has become a billion-dollar indus-
try,8 4 and the geo-stationary orbit, the orbital space above the
Equator, likely exists as "the most valuable of all space resources
to date. '8 5 Satellites in geo-stationary orbit travel at the same
speed as the earth, making the satellites appear stationary over a
fixed point on earth and casting large footprints over highly
populated areas.8 6 In fact, a satellite in geo-stationary orbit en-
compasses a field of view of 42% of the earth's land surface. 7
Like the law governing the use of the seabed, the international
community established an international regime to regulate and
coordinate spectrum use.
The International Telegraph Union (ITU), supplemented by
the International Telecommunications Convention (ITC), be-
came the technical body that regulates international telecom-
munications.88 The ITU utilizes two methods of orbit slot
allocation: the posteriori system and the a priori system. Under
the posteriori system, the ancient "first in time, first in right"
property theory, the ITU assigns orbit slots as the need arises.89
Obviously, developed nations who possess the technology neces-
sary to exploit the space favor this system.90 The a priori system,
however, allots a number of slots to each nation, regardless of
whether use of the slots will ever occur.91 Because less-devel-
oped nations fear that they will lose access to orbital slots due to
their insufficient technology, they prefer the latter system.92
Entities can take advantage of an a priori system. For example,
the small Pacific island nation of Tonga registered for sixteen
geo-stationary orbit allotments with the ITU.93 Tonga made the
filings on behalf of Friendly Islands Communications from 1988
to 1990, when the ITU system allowed a country to register a
83 Adrian Copiz, Scarcity in Space: The International Regulation of Satellites, 10
CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 207, 218 (2002).
84 Reinstein, supra note 68, at 59.
85 Id. at 64.
86 Zullo, supra note 32, at 2420-21.
87 Copiz, supra note 83, at 210.
88 Susan Cahill, Give Me My Space: Implications for Permitting National Appropria-
tion of the Geostationary Orbit, 19 WIs. INT'L L.J. 231, 232 (2001).
89 Id. at 238.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 239.
93 Copiz, supra note 83, at 208.
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position for up to nine years before a satellite was launched.94
Because Tonga "lacked a genuine need for so many orbital allot-
ments in the Pacific Rim portion of the GSO," the international
community made its anger known. 5 The "outrage" of the inter-
national community persuaded Tonga to withdraw its request
for ten of the sixteen allotments.96 However, Tonga leased one
of the remaining allotments and auctioned off the other five al-
lotments for $2 million per year for each orbit.97 According to
at least one commenter, "[tlhis rental and auctioning of slots
supports the perception that property rights do exist with re-
spect to individual orbits. 98
Due in part to the incident with Tonga, the ITU now requires
that the majority of slots applied for must be used directly by the
countries requesting the slots.99 The ITU likely wants to dis-
courage the leasing and sale of geo-stationary orbit slots.100
However, an issue still exists with respect to the Outer Space
Treaty and orbit slot regulation.
The ITU distributes orbit slots to those who provide the most
efficient use of the resource, reasoning that distributing slots to
those not capable of utilizing them would waste a finite re-
source. 10 1 It follows that, by following an a priori system, the ITU
would grant constructive national appropriation when allocat-
ing orbital slots to nations-an express prohibition under the
Outer Space Treaty.1 0 2 Regardless of the prohibition, some na-
tions attempted to claim the geo-stationary orbit.
In 1976, several less-developed nations located at the equator
claimed territorial sovereignty over the geo-stationary orbit with
the Bogota Declaration.103 The nations contended that the nat-
ural resources of each sovereignty necessarily included the geo-
stationary orbit above that territory.0 4 Though the Declaration
directly conflicted with the Outer Space Treaty which prohibits
national appropriation of space, it became "effective as a politi-





98 Cahill, supra note 88, at 244.
99 Id.
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101 Zullo, supra note 32, at 2421.
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104 Cahill, supra note 88, at 240.
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cerns over being prohibited access to the geo stationary orbit by
developed countries who already possessed the technological
skills and resources necessary to utilize the resource."' 5 This
resulted in the implementation of Article 33 of the ITU's Radio
Regulations, which requires that the ITU consider "the special
needs of developing countries and the geographical situation of
particular countries. "106
The entire system directly conflicts with the Outer Space
Treaty if the ITU grants slots to nations because the Outer
Space Treaty expressly prohibits national appropriation.10 7 The
ITU seems to focus on the idea of "access" rather than owner-
ship. 108 However, despite the label, when a satellite fills an orbit
slot, the party occupies that space and effectively asserts sover-
eignty. This concept seems no different than an unmanned sta-
tion on the moon; the space being used becomes inaccessible to
others.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the fierce intent of the international community, full
acceptance of the common heritage principle will come slowly,
if at all. Though evolution shapes life, such progression re-
quires time. Life on earth shows that physical evolution results
when a need arises. However, man's broad acceptance of a com-
mon heritage approach to land and its resources demands a psy-
chological evolution rather than a physical change mandated by
his environment. Man seems incapable of such change; conse-
quently, psychological evolution will require intense, long-last-
ing global effort.
The international community cannot reverse thousands of
years of behavior in one generation. Ancient, nomadic man
fought over land resources when permanent occupation of a sin-
gle area proved impossible due to the essential pursuit of food.
Later, when farming and agriculture replaced nomadic exis-
tence, man fought over the land itself-as well as its resources.
As technology advances, this pattern will continue into space
and other previously uninhabitable areas on earth.
Acceptance of the common heritage ideal (psychological
evolution) will better only the existence of nations currently una-
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Copiz, supra note 83.
108 Cahill, supra note 88, at 241.
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ble to fully exploit the resources. History illustrates that man
evolves only to survive or better his existence. For example,
many theorists believe that man became bipedal only when the
grasslands gradually replaced the forests, thus compelling man
to stand upright (to see game over the grass). Sickle cell ane-
mia, an affliction of many Africans, effectively protects against
malaria, a deadly disease common in Africa. Similarly, skin pig-
mentation of native peoples, offering crucial protection against
the sun's ultraviolet rays, varies depending on proximity to the
equator. Unfortunately, no such physical need exists here.
Technologically advanced nations do not feel compelled to
harmonize their mindset with the common heritage principle.
Advanced nations will increasingly continue to exploit space re-
sources, leaving the less-developed nations in their wake. Most
likely, less-developed nations will also disregard the common
heritage ideal as they develop the necessary technology and
rediscover the sheer advantage of the "first in time, first in right"
property theory. Only nations without hope of exploitation
urge equal distribution of the resources. Those who exploit
space resources desire to keep the fruits of their labor to them-
selves. Throughout history, the more powerful man has innately
and strategically kept his foot on the neck of the weak. The
quest for property in space will prove no different, and the in-
consistency of international space law confirms man's lack of
control over his true substance.
Man mirrors the cyclical nature of the universe, where every-
thing follows a pattern. In The Sun Also Rises, Hemingway ex-
pressed that each generation carries on as the one before it-
resolving nothing-because the rhythmical essence of life re-
mains unchanged. 10 9 Aldous Huxley expressed a similar senti-
ment in his realization that sometimes only the name or the
process changes, but the underlying theme remains eternal.110
Man, like the universe, follows a pattern-one of acquisitive
need and selfish procurement. The ancient "first in time, first
in right" property theory will come full circle: ancient man first
fought over earth's resources-and then the land itself when oc-
cupation became feasible. To the dismay of less-developed na-
tions, this cycle will continue in space, as man exploits celestial
109 See generally ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE SUN ALSO RISES (Charles Scribner's
Sons 1926).
110 See supra text accompanying note 1.
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resources and later develops the ability to occupy celestial
bodies.
As a solution, the international community could agree to ab-
stain from exploitation for a period of time, as in the Antarctic
Treaty.1"' Though such a moratorium obviously leaves the issue
for the next generation to resolve, perhaps a subsequent genera-
tion would embrace more fully the common heritage approach.
Right now, man simply seems unprepared for such a concept.
M See Naval Treaty Implementation, Antartic [sic] Treaty, available at http://
www.nawcwpns.navy.mil/treaty/Ant.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2005) (stating that
representatives of twelve nations signed the Antarctic Treaty on December 1,
1959, and the treaty became effective in 1961). Those original signatories were:
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France,Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South
Africa, United Kingdom, United States and the USSR. Id. The Antarctic Treaty
applies to the area south of 60' South latitude. Id. Through this agreement, the
countries active in Antarctica consult on the uses of the whole continent, with a
commitment that it should not become the scene or object of international dis-
cord. See also Antarctica, supra note 36 (stating that the 24th Antarctic Treaty Con-
sultative Meeting was held in Russia inJuly 2001). At the end of 2001, there were
forty-five treaty member nations: twenty-seven consultative and eighteen non-con-
sultative. Consultative (voting) members include the seven nations that claim
portions of Antarctica as national territory (some claims overlap) and 20 nonclai-
mant nations. Id. The U.S. and Russia have reserved the right to make claims and
the U.S. does not recognize the claims of others. Id. Antarctica is administered
through meetings of the consultative member nations. Id. Decisions from these
meetings are carried out by these member nations (within their areas) in accor-
dance with their own national laws. Id.
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